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‘To most people Bermuda is known as an island of rest, a haven to  
which North Americans flee to escape the aggravations of winter and  
the vulgarities of American culture. Tourist brochures project this 
Atlantic Island quite justly as a scenic outpost where it is still 
possible to find the vestiges of the old colonial society which has long  
since disappeared from the American mainland’.  
 
Selwyn D. Ryan (1970:5) 
 
‘Because we are a small island society, we have developed a code of 
manners which enables us to live - despite all the myriad of frictions 
that actually exist - in quite good peace and harmony...There are a  
very large number of mutual confidences which must be routinely kept  
by a very large number of people whose paths cross in many different 
settings... we do demonstrate...an inclination to say one thing in 
public, and do or say something very different in private...’ 
 
Larry Burchall (1991:79) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Highlighting the colonial formation of contemporary politics in Bermuda is like 
trying to film ships or areoplanes as they vanish into the fabled Bermuda 
Triangle. With one point off the coast of South Carolina and the other off the 
shores of the Bahamas, Bermuda is the third point and namesake of this 
mysterious phenomenon.1.Covering an expanse of the Atlantic Ocean, the 
Bermuda Triangle's phenomenality is rooted in its reputation as an area where 
ships, planes, navigators and passengers have disappeared without a trace and 
to date and with no reasonable explanation. In Bermudian politics a similar 
  
disappearance occurs where there is a ritual displacement of references to the 
colonial themes of its underlying structural antagonisms. This includes the impact 
of transatlantic slavery, the implications of British colonial administration and the 
legacy of white, male, minority rule. It is as if the very engagement of the 
persisting social inequalities rooted in and exacerbated by these legacies is 
considered unbefitting of acceptable political discourse. Much like the planes, 
ships and people swept into the Bermuda Triangle, central tenets of local 
colonialized ruling practices become untraceable. Largely disavowed and 
rendered unsubstantiated, debate and interrogation becomes problematic, 
deemed not only ill-mannered but beyond the realm of what is 'speakable'. 
Dissimilar to the Bermuda Triangle, however, is the re/appearance of these same 
underlying antagonisms. For despite all manner of denial, local legacies and 
continued colonial imperatives of rule are intricately woven into the fabric of 
Bermudian society. Pushed beyond the parameters of legitimate political 
discourse, these formations of localised colonial power have not vanished, but 
rather have been reworked as dis/appearing and re/appearing signifiers of 
unresolved structural inequalities that inhabit and inhibit the constituional 
anatomy of Bermuda's body-politic. 
 
I want to consider this as a metaphorical background to Bermuda’s 1995 
referendum on whether the island should move to establish constitutional 
independence from Britain. The event marked a rare occasion when the tiny 
Island colony was spotlighted in international news. In the fleeting images of 
globally signified political events however, the legacy of the colonial 
entanglements surrounding the liberal-democratic question 'Do you favour 
independence for Bermuda' were all but air-brushed out. With the fantasy 
photographs and hype of sun, beauty and tranquillity so often used to describe 
this tourist destination soon back in place, what was largely glossed over were 
the momentary but unavoidable exposures of underlying social antagonisms of 
political life in Bermuda. This perhaps is what prompted one British newspaper, 
the Daily Telegraph, to describe the protracted independence episode as 'one of 
the strangest liberation struggles the Empire has seen' (6th Jan 1995). My 
concerns in this chapter lie with the nature of the specific configuration of local 
and colonial power/discourse in Bermuda that pervaded the independence 
debate. The momentary exposure and disappearance of the influence of colonial 
formations in current political discourse is a central theme. Situated in the 
colonial absented present, I will argue that ruling practices in Bermuda remain as 
much determined by the enduring legacies of the colonial regime as they are by 
the continual disavowal of these colonial imperatives. The identity of Bermuda 
lies somewhere between the formations of an extant British colony and an ex-
British colony. It is a place where colonial denial is so pervasive, where notions of 
colonialism have become so ambiguous, and where the articulation of legacies 
and continuities of colonial rule seem to evade political discourse. The main 
question underlying this chapter, is what can the entanglements of colonial 
societies such as Bermuda tell us about contemporary formations of 
representation in quasi-colonial political cultures? I begin by providing a brief 
  
over-view of Bermudian society. Secondly, I examine how the question of 
independence was articulated in different political discourses and how these 
became implicated in under-stating colonial and western points of entanglement 
(Hesse, 1997). Finally, I consider some of the political and discursive logic 
involved in facilitating Bermuda's conjuring tricks and disappearing acts. 
 
RE-MAPPING THE LANDSCAPE 
Bermuda is a small colony with a history that is in many ways distinct from many 
of the former colonies in this region of Caribbean islands. Colonised in 1612, 
Bermuda was the second British colony to be established2. Proving an early 
success, Bermuda started out as a plantation colony, but by the end of the 
seventeenth century the land had been forsaken for the more lucrative seafaring 
pursuits. This resulted in a large white resident population out of which emerged 
Bermuda's local oligarchy. This form of local government continued with the rise 
and decline of the seafaring industries that characterised early Bermudian slave 
society and the shift to horticulture soon after slave Emancipation3. A small 
seafaring community with a large number of resident whites (the numerical 
majority until the 1830s), Bermuda is also distinct in that unlike the colonies in the 
Caribbean where the local oligarchies (save Barbados and the Bahamas) were 
replaced in the making of crown colonies, during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, local oligarchic rule in Bermuda remained intact. In place since the 
seventeenth century, it was not until 1963 that the ancien regime of the local 
oligarchy was usurped. This is what Ryan (1970) alludes to when he reminds us, 
‘Bermuda is more than a major resort. It is also an Island on which live a distinct 
people with a political system and style of life that is unique.’ (Ryan, 1970:1) It 
was under this political regime that tourism and international trade developed in 
the first decades of the twentieth century. This resulted in unprecedented 
economic growth and development , consequently by the mid-twentieth century 
Bermuda, under the continuing social dictates of a white oligarchy, was 
ensonced in an economic boom that was to last unabated until the 1980s.  
 
Describing political life before the 1960s transformations, Gordon Lewis (1968) 
observed that, 'it remained the private game. of the Assembly parliamentarians', 
the political issues, 'the picayune (or petty) matters that affected their 
constitutional dignity or their commercial interests, generating factional passions 
that left the inert majority unmoved' (Lewis, 1968:313). In 1950s Bermuda (as in 
Bermuda's more distant past), a meeting of the merchants and businessmen who 
owned the local banks, businesses and offices along Front Street, the main 
street of Bermuda's capital, could easily have been mistaken for a session in the 
House of Assembly, such was the overlap. It was these men and their 
forefathers, brothers, uncles-in-laws and sons who ran the major local 
businesses and occupied the great majority of the parliamentary seats. Thus until 
the 1960s economic and political power in Bermuda remained rooted in the 
crosscurrents of inequalities which were an imperative to both local white 
minority rule and colonial dictate. In describing the logic of this enduring local 
formation framing colonial Bermuda, Frank Manning (1978), observes: 
  
 
'generally known in Bermuda as either Front Street (their commercial 
Address) or the Forty thieves (their acquisitive style) ... (power) had been 
maintained through the instruments of economic patronage: jobs, loans, credit, 
recallable mortgages, charitable donations. Supporters of Front Street found it a 
paternal, even benevolent oligarchy. Opponents usually lost all they had' 
(Manning, 1978:17). 
 
Central to the rule of the oligarchy was control of the franchise, racial segregation 
and clear differentiations between gender, the classes and white ethnic groups. A 
limited, property-based franchise ensured that political power remained in the 
hands of a small white minority. With gender, as much a constitutive marker of 
difference as 'race', power remained in the hands of white men. In 1944, when 
propertied women were granted the right to hold office and vote in municipal, 
parochial and parliamentary elections, it was done so with the stated 
understanding that there would be no further changes4. With an increasing 
number of 'coloured' Bermudians becoming eligible to vote and a concerted effort 
underway to increase their numbers in the House of Assembly, local ruling 
practices continued to be dictated by those who were white, male and propertied. 
This had been strenuously guarded and with a population of 43,000 in 1958 only 
7,203 people were eligible to vote 
 
However, although privileged by 'race', in local formations of power and rule, 
disenfranchised working and middle-class whites and the descendants of migrant 
Portuguese workers who had been recruited in the late nineteenth, faced social 
and political exclusion5. The imperatives of white, minority rule worked to exclude 
all those non-white, non-male, non-propertied and this was reflected in all 
aspects of Bermudian society. Again unlike many of the colonies in the 
Caribbean, efforts made to establish trade unions and a political party system in 
Bermuda were thwarted. Effective resistance against the attempts by the Crown 
for reform, together with the imperatives of local rule framing the emergent tourist 
and international trade industries, ensured that Bermuda's oligarchy remained 
economically and politically intact.  
 
In a maiden speech in the House of Assembly during the dawning years of the 
twentieth century, one white MCP, Colonel Thomas Dill, proudly proclaimed,' I 
think the sole reason we have not gone the way of a great many sister colonies is 
due to the fact that we are not a democratic country. We are an oligarchy... (A)t 
any rate there is nothing like, and I hope there will never be, anything 
approaching adult universal suffrage.' (Philip, 1987:4). However, although intact, 
the strident arrogance of such power had by the mid twentieth century 
weakened. It was challenged by women from the white elite, woman suffrage 
campaign (1921 - 1944), coupled with rising criticism from within sections of the 
oligarchy, and reinforced by the emerging politicisation of the black community 
who had long fought against the imperatives of white minority rule. By the 1950s 
oligarchic authority had been considerably undermined. In addition subsequent 
  
influences drawn from contemporaneous anti-colonial struggless in the Third 
World and the United States civil rights movements catalysed mass 
demonstrations and boycotts by black Bermudians calling for desegregation and 
universal suffrage. By 1965, racialized segregation had been outlawed, universal 
suffrage had been granted and wide-ranging social and economic reforms were 
being implemented.  
 
It was also during this period that the first political parties were established, the 
Progressive Labour Party (PLP) and the United Bermuda Party (UBP). With the 
PLP dedicated to 'promoting the cause of blacks and labour,' (the Bermuda 
Recorder, February 16th, 1963), and the UBP comprised of the majority of 
already elected MCPs, the two parties were very quickly taken to be 
representative of the racial polarities which had for so long been the basis of 
local rule6. By 1968, the symbols of democratic rule - universal suffrage, political 
parties, and equal rights - had replaced those of white minority rule. However 
having the majority of members of parliament already in office, the UBP 
immediately became the party in power and at the time of the 1995 referendum 
had been in power for over three decades. Reworked, unresolved legacies of 
white minority rule continued to shape Bermudian society. 
 
COLONIAL ARTICULATIONS AND DIS/APPEARING ACTS 
Colonial rule is entangled in Bermuda in the legacy of white minority rule which it 
for so long legitimised and endorsed. The PLP have contested it since inception, 
just as the UBP has advocated for its continuance since its formation. By the 
1970s, however, the UBP government moved to a more neutral position on 
independence, albeit one that increasingly defined independence in terms of 
dollars and cents7. This was to continue until 1994 when quite dramatically, the 
UBP leader and Premier of Bermuda, Sir John Swan, announced that the 
question of independence was to be put to the people. Raised unexpectedly and 
catching politicians and Bermudians generally off guard, by the time the date had 
been set for the referendum, the issue of independence was at the forefront of 
political debate and consideration. 
 
It is possible to identify the articulation of three main discourses during the run up 
to the 1995 independence referendum: Firstly that Bermuda enjoyed and must 
maintain its economic stability, which was largely ensured by political stability 
and continued coloniality; secondly, that independence was the next necessary 
step to taken in the political development of the Island; and thirdly, that 
independence was inevitable, but that local, constitutional changes must preface 
a change in Bermuda's status as a colony. These three dominant political 
discourses clearly reveal the changed considerations facing countries seeking 
independence in the late twentieth century. In connecting the viability of 
remaining a British independent territory with the perception of political stability 
the international business world insisted upon, the thrust of independence as the 
liberation of an colonised people that had been such a rallying cry decades 
before was bizarrely displaced. At a time when colonialism is for so many people 
  
and nations a legacy of the distant past, independence as a measure of 
Bermuda's coming of age was rendered markedly different from the past strident 
and difficult struggles to end colonial rule. Although the entrenchment of the 
colonial imperative in the structures and processes of local governance that had 
also been critical to other countries desire to end colonialism seemed, on first 
glance at least, to be equally susceptible to dislocation, careful reflection 
however, reveals something else. For Bermuda has been convincingly described 
quite cynically as a place where there is a "code of manners" regulating all 
discourse, where people are by necessity "public liars and private, very private, 
tellers of truth "(Burchall, 1978). What such an observation reveals is the impact 
of silenced manifestations of rule and power. As Burchall argues contextually, 
'we still have to live, cheek by jowl, with our fellow Bermudians... (S) imilarly, no 
matter how strong your disagreement is with someone on this island, he or she 
will always be visible, and relatively close to you' (Burchall, 1978: 178).  
 
This means in the wider realms of political discourse and debate, where 
subtleties and contradictions are perhaps well established and expected, the loss 
or the dis/appearance of pertinent aspects governing Bermudian society attains 
greater significance. It is in the realm of public political discourse in particular that 
any interrogation or critique of the structural antagonisms underpinning this 
British colony is necessarily momentary, unstable and fraught with ambiguity. 
Thus despite the appeals to economic and cultural considerations seemingly 
freed from social context and racialised and genderized consequence, these 
discourses can be (re) read as signifiers of ‘otherness’. They can be understood 
as coded voice-overs with regard to the underlying repertoire of systems of 
meaning and representation in which cultural differences and inequalities evolve, 
and contested imaginaries of Bermuda remain rooted. Below I consider in turn 
each of the three discourses to the independence debate. 
 
Independence as an economic consideration: Rooted in an economy which 
since the opening decades of the twentieth century has depended on foreign 
investment and tourism, the servicing and dependence of multinationals has not 
been seen as a problem, but rather as a pivotal, though precarious feature of 
Bermuda's economic base. Unlike ex-colonies faced with recolonization (i.e. 'the 
further consolidation and exacerbation of capitalist relations and exploitation' 
(Alexander and Mohanty, 1997: xxi) from powerful nations other than those 
whose colonial rein they had initially been under), what was seen as paramount 
in Bermuda was maintaining the economic stability such dependence had long 
engendered. Unless deemed economically expedient, independence was seen 
as too great a risk. As James Ahiakpor (1990) commented, in his analysis of 
Bermuda's engagement with its status, ‘the issue of greatest concern in the 
debate over political independence for Bermuda is the impact of such a decision 
on the country's economy" (Ahikapo, 1990:35). Grounding this economic 
consideration was the narrative of Bermuda's long legacy of local representative 
government and the suggestion that having had a large measure of self- 
governing for so long, Bermuda had lost the stain of colonial rule. Economically 
  
prosperous and self-sufficient, allowed to fly its own flag (although the Union 
Jack are is included), having a Bermuda national song much like an national 
anthem, and with Bermuda Day having replaced Empire Day, Bermuda had 
taken on the air, if not the status, of a self-governing nation. "Independence", 
opponents asked, "from who?" (Musson, 1979:65).  
 
This was a discourse in which all other considerations were seen to pale into 
insignificance. For Elton Trimingham, chairman of the local bank of Bermuda, the 
'we' in 'can we afford independence?' was an inclusive 'we' which transcended all 
others considerations (see The Royal Gazette July 20th, 1995:3). Mention or 
consideration of 'race' was deemed 'emotive, divisive and unnecessary'. It was 
insisted by the main instigator of the referendum, the Premier, Sir John Swan, 
that a move would bring 'the races closer together was 'dismissed as one that 
could only backfire'. (The Bermuda Royal Gazette, August 14th, 1995:3). It is in 
the tracking of this particular debate that its coded nature becomes clear. Read 
as a discursive signifier the discourse of economic expediency and the drawing 
on the history of local rule in the Island marked less the advent of a new 
relationship between colonised and coloniser, than the ways in which structural 
antagonisms underlying the legacies of local white minority rule and the 
continuities of colonialism had now come to be articulated.  
 
Usurped by the socio - political transformations of the 1960s, the residual power 
of Bermuda's local oligarchy nonetheless remained. The formation of Party 
politics in 1963 resulting in the birth of the United Bermuda Party which, although 
seeking 'non-white' membership, was nevertheless made up of leading 
representatives of the political arm of the oligarchy. The result had been one of 
gradual reform and the denial and silencing of the past. With slogans and 
election manifestos such as 'Together the United Way' (1968), 'Bermuda on the 
move together: The United Way' (1972), 'The Partnership that Works' (1976) 
sending out messages of unity and commonality amongst all groups, the 
economic and political processes remained, under the UBP government, dictated 
to the needs of Bermuda's white elite (Wilson, 1977; Manning, 1978).  
 
Thus, it was that the legacy of white oligarchy and its racialised logic that 
continued to be largely reflected in the Island's areas of economic and political 
power. Writing on Bermuda in the late 1970s Jeyaratnam Wilson underlines this 
point where he observes, it is the 'fear of ultimate black domination on the part of 
the whites and the resentment by the blacks of continuing white supremacy (that) 
characterise the socio-political setting in Bermuda' (Wilson, 1977:258). Central to 
this logic has been negation and denial. This together with the imperatives of 
integrative partnership and cultural diversity structuring all political discourse 
since the transformations of the 1960s has meant that the unresolved and 
discursively forced aside antagonisms have become that much more coded.  
 
In the months and weeks leading up to August 15, 1995, the scheduled day of 
the Referendum on Independence, the coding of such denials became 
  
increasingly fragile and problematic. Although independence was spoken of as 
an economic consideration that would eat into the pockets of all Bermudians, it 
was clear that to speak of economic considerations and the legacy of self-rule 
was to invoke a history of white economic dominance and hegemony. Underlying 
this particular discourse was a largely coded defence against further 
destabilisation and possible eradication of the socio-economic and political 
structures which were rooted in the legacies of white minority rule - a power base 
traditionally legitimated by, although seen to be somewhat removed from the 
dictates of the English Crown. What was at stake was not only the changing of 
Bermuda's colonial status, but the ending of a significant symbol, on which the 
authority and legitimating power to rule had so long rested and which, although 
transformed, remained ingrained in whiteness.  
 
Independence prefaced by local constitutional change: Was this counter-
hegemonic discourse or acquiescence? Independence had been advocated by 
the PLP since its inception. There were those like PLP activist and Barrister Phil 
Perinchef who loudly advocated an affirmative reply. In an newspaper article he 
asserted that ‘the narrow traditional right wing politics' that produced segregation 
and a host of other inequalities are 'dead on their feet. Their burial is imminent. 
Their days are numbered. The game is up. The black man (sic) is in ascendancy 
in Bermuda' (Bermuda Royal Gazette, August 14th, 1995:3). By the 1990s such 
militancy and single-minded passion for independence was no longer emanating 
from the PLP leadership. With independence less of a matter of emancipation 
and liberation from the yoke of colonialism as it had been described during the 
1960s and1970s, independence was seen more as an inevitability that must be 
prefaced with local constitutional change. This is what was articulated most 
strongly by the Opposition Party and it was on this basis that the PLP advised its 
supporters to refrain from voting in the referendum. The thrust of the PLP 
campaign was that reforms to the local political structure and the constitution had 
to be implemented before independence could be considered. The reforms 
included an unfettered electoral system - essentially one person, one vote, each 
vote of equal value. The PLP had been fighting for these objectives since the 
revamped electoral system came on line in the early 1960s. With the UBP having 
neither provided an indication as to the path independence would take, nor 
addressed the electoral and constitutional reforms insisted on by the PLP, it was 
argued that to move to independence would be to lock into existing inequalities 
(Bermuda Royal Gazette, July 14th, 1995).  
 
Moreover, considering a referendum not an ideal way to determine such an 
important step, the PLP insisted that Independence be a part of an Election 
platform, so that all the political parties would be forced to present a detailed plan 
of their vision of an independent Bermuda to the people - a plan that would get 
the people's endorsement on Election Day. As the chairman of the PLP 
referendum campaign committee explained, 'to withhold the vote and not chose 
to participate in the upcoming referendum is an active means of protest and of 
registering dissatisfaction with the manner of deciding independence for 
  
Bermuda' (The Royal Gazette, August 14th, 1995)) This point was driven home 
by the PLP campaign slogan: 'Independence Yes! Referendum No!'  
 
Stigmatised for its ardent opposition to racial and class inequality and unable to 
break the power of the UBP who had in the past accused the PLP of fostering 
'disharmony and advocating (reverse) racism' (Wilson, 1977:269), it was 
apparent that by 1995 the PLP had moved away from a pro-black socialist 
position to one decidedly, (though not acknowledged) conservative. It is possible 
this could be regarded simply as a political tactic with local constitutional change 
a concern for all Bermudians. But if we trace the historical logic of this discourse, 
it becomes clear that the constitutional considerations the PLP were so 
adamantly concerned with were rooted in the political re-structuring of the Island 
that had taken place in the early 1960s. It was during this period following the 
establishment of universal suffrage and desegregation, that the electoral districts 
had been remapped to ensure that if voting was conducted along racial lines 
there could never be a black majority in power. The 'one man, one vote' 
campaign, begun in the 1960s was a direct response to this re-structuring. The 
call for local constitutional change was also a call to change the reworking of a 
hierarchy of inequalities, revolving chiefly around 'race', which had been put in 
place in the very dismantling of white minority rule.  
 
During the Referendum debate, the PLP's stress on constitutional change 
perhaps came closest to exposing Bermuda’s ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott, 1992) in 
a more covert interrogation of the continued racialised logic of Bermuda's political 
structures. But it was also a position that seemed to give succour to strident 
defences of the colonial past. Many veteran PLP members such as Phil 
Perinchief, took exception to this decision and publicly opposed the PLP 
campaign. Thus, to speak of local electoral reform, much like the their opponents 
insistence on the legacy of the Island' economic and political stability, was 
inadvertently to evoke the racialization of those crucial aspects of Bermuda's 
history that in the political climate of 1995 they had sought to avoid and rework in 
the coded narrative of constitutionalism. In what Toni Morrison (1992) has called 
a polite, ‘graceful even generous act’ of ignoring 'race', the expansive rhetoric of 
constitutionalism worked to foster another ‘substitute language’ in which direct 
and sustained interrogation of the colonial entanglements were expediently 
evaded.  
 
Independence as the next step in Bermuda's political evolution: Having 
initially gained the support of his party, the push for independence came directly 
from the Premier and leader of the UBP Sir John Swan. Also drawing on the 
economic success and the long history of self-rule, the argument made was that 
independence was the next evolutionary step in Bermuda's political development. 
Rooted in the concern to represent Bermuda as striving to take its place in the 
modern world, Independence was taken to be a sign of the Island's maturity and 
economic stability. This ideal of independence was also constructed as 
coterminous with the apparent evolution of racial and ethnic power relations in 
  
the Island, marking a heightened sense of empathy and harmony freed from the 
legacies of the past. The push was to conceptualise the economic and social 
successes of the Island with a united partnership amongst all Bermudians, 
thereby vanquishing along with colonial rule, all the traces of monoculturalism 
and white hegemony. Taking on board the economic stability as well as the 
cultural legacy of self-rule, the argument was one that sought to promote a new 
vision of Bermuda. Articulated most vehemently by the Premier it was a vision 
built neither on the direct negation of the colonial legacy nor on its covert 
evasion, but one where these factors simply no longer mattered.  
 
Much like the two other discourses disseminated in the months and weeks 
leading up to August 15th, 1995, this discourse proved untenable, and quickly 
shifted to an the insistence that 'this will be our country, each of us will be 
responsible for it' and that independence could be a 'powerful and incredible 
catalyst for a subtle shift of attitude' (Bermuda Royal Gazette July 19th, 1995:5). 
Although the discourse had begun as a step heralding the end of white 
hegemony and the inequalities of the past, it had reinvented its vision of 
independence as a panacea for a ‘divided society' (Ibid). It was here that the 
'conjuring tricks' of Bermudian political discourse faltered and revealed 
themselves. If the issue of independence was seen as a litmus test of Bermuda's 
ability to successfully keep its structural divisions not just displaced and 
'‘somewhere out there' but vanquished, forever considered of no great 
consequence, it was contaminated at its point of enunciation by the very opposite 
message.  
 
In the weeks leading up to the 1995 referendum, the usually latent and hidden 
notions of white supremacy clashed with the push to end the colonial imperatives 
which had always under-pinned that social order. In addition the the 'code of 
manners' (Burchall, 1978) so central to discourse and representation in Bermuda 
was breached and the denied and evaded racialized logic continuing to underpin 
Bermudian society became clearly, albeit momentarily and intermittantly, visible. 
The colonial legacy was something that had to re-represented in order to be 
negated, it could not be dismissed without being summoned. In the end the 
opponents of independence and the PLP were victorious, the people of Bermuda 
voted 'No' and the Premier resigned as he had promised. Yet despite the 
triangular diagreements each of the competing political discouses appeared 
incapable of avoiding the social dictates of denying the relevance of contested 
colonialities. 
 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL DICTATES 
In this section I want to reflect on some implications of the entanglement of the 
colonial legacy for the meaning of politics in Bermuda, all of which were 
symbolised by the competing reactions to the independence referendum debate 
which nevertheless revealed a colonial consensuality. William Connolly (1988) 
has suggested that the elimination of conflict in political discourse is tantamount 
to the elimination of politics. In the Bermudan referendum despite the existence 
  
of three distinct political perspectives, the question of 'race' was consenually 
expelled from the political agenda. In being naturalised, rather than politicised 
this meant that the colonial formations of Bermuda had to be emptied of 
contemporary meaning so there could be not doubt as to what Bermuda signified 
as a unifying national identity. Yet paradoxically it was precisely the different 
ways in which the logic of denial and disavowal were put to work in these 
competing political discourses that actually signified Bermuda as an 'essentially 
contested concept'. And as Connolly points out 'essentially contested concepts' 
are central to the formation of political discourse These two aspects of Connolly's 
analysis must be understood as contextualizing the argument presented in this 
chapter. Firstly, the concept of political discourse refers to a vocabulary that is 
commonly employed in the relation between political thought and action. It 
describes the way in which meanings 'conventionally embodied' in a vocabulary 
define the framework in which political thought is articulated and the criteria that 
must be met before an event or reference can be established as political. Only 
when this framework is endorsed and related criteria met can the status of 
political be accorded (Connolly, 1988). There is of course a certain circularity to 
this reasoning, it means for example that within Bermudian political discourse the 
idea that 'race' and colonialism belonged outside the remit of politics signified the 
necessary and sufficient criteria of what counted as political discourse. The 
paradox was however that in order to invoke the outside of political discourse, 
the 'unspeakable' had to be articulated, 'race' and colonialism had to be 
connotated within political discourse, in this way casting Bermudian national 
identity within the frame of the second aspect of Connolly's analysis, an 
essentially contestable concept. This can be characterised in two ways. As an 
'appraisive' concept, it suggests that a desired state of affairs should be 
understood as a valued achievement. Thus Bermuda as it was represented in 
each different political discourse was the contested object not only of different 
value claims on the future, but of different exclusions in the formation of (post) 
colonial discourse. While as an 'internally complex' concept Bermuda had several 
dimensions, including agreed and contested rules as to which of its 
representations were shared and which were open to interpretation. As an 
essentially contestable concept then, the meaning of Bermuda was bound to 
'involve endless disputes' (Connolly, 1988) during the referendum. It was 
because these disputes were prolonged within the acceptable parameters of 
political discourse that the intermittent references to 'race' and the colonial legacy 
successively interrupted attempts to polarise the colonial past and the quasi-
colonial present.  
 
We should not of course assume that the configural but denied role that 'race' 
played here is not unique to colonial Bermuda. It shares similarities with societies 
such as the Jim Crow states in the southern United States prior to the 1960s and 
even South Africa where racial demarcation was "endemic to their socio-political 
fabric and heritage" (Higgenbotham: 1996:186). Examining the American south 
prior to racial desegregation, Evelyn Brook Higgenbotham argues that where 
racial demarcation is endemic to the socio-political fabric and heritage of a 
  
society, 'race' serves as a sign, a 'metalanguage' that 'lends meaning to a host of 
terms and expression, to a myriad of aspects that would otherwise fall outside 
the referential domain of race' (Higgenbotham, 1996). This is irrespective of 
whether or not it is denied, as in the case of Bermuda. Similarly  the conjuring 
away of 'race' is not unique to Bermuda. This is a theme that Toni Morrison 
(1992) explores in a powerful series of essays where she reflects on the 
dis/appearing presence of African - American people in the nationally coded 
literary imagination. Morrison argues that although hidden and literally silenced in 
the historically racialized society of the United States, the presence of African-
Americans can be tracked in the canonical nineteenth and twentieth century 
literary work of writers such as Mark Twain, Edgar Allan Poe , Herman Melville 
and Ernest Hemingway. For Morrison the formation of the United States was 
rooted in the Constitution and its necessarily coded language and purposeful 
restrictions to dealing with "the racial disingenuousness and moral fragility " 
(Morrison, 1992: .6) that lay at its heart. This process also shaped US literature, 
the founding characteristics of which extended into the twentieth century. The 
consequences of cultural formations of denial suggests Morrison obliges us to 
decode the logic of their ‘conjured silence’ (Morrrison, 1992: 51). 
 
Morrison's work is helpful here because it helps us to appreciate that the 
racialized logic underpinning colonial Bermuda is not unique but has analogous 
features in the founding and permeating structures of  western  societies 
generally. In her (re) reading of  (white) American literary writers, Morrison  
indicates a way of underscoring the hidden Africanist presence. The 
methodological reward of this approach to analysis is undoubtedly the delight in 
finding proof of such a presence, rather than remaining at the level of 
disappointment in the 'uncoded' ways of reading. This points to a need to be ever 
mindful of the contested historical specificities of place and power in the 
inscription of political discourse. In the confines of colonial Bermuda the 
jettisoning of 'race' beyond the parameters of acceptable political discourse is not 
simply the necessary discursive erasure of a central, organising power dynamic 
of coloniality. Rather, it is also as Burchall has rightly contended rooted in the 
socially consenualising ‘code of practice’ which insists that in the small confines 
of the Island, ‘despite all the myriad of frictions that actually exist’ polite and non-
jarring language dictates respectable political practice (Burchall, 1991:79). Hence 
the apparent crisis when the dream of a Bermuda freed from such constraints 
revealed what was generally held to be concealed. This was as much a response 
to the sensibilities and dictates of Bermudian culture as it was to the revelation 
that these vestiges of colonial rule were so blatantly exposed. If Connolly (1988) 
provides us with a theoretical understanding for the consensual yet contested 
logic underpinning political discourse in Bermudian society, then Higgenbotham 
(1996) and Morrison (1992) provide critical insight into the racialized nature of its 
systematic disavowals. These cultural specificities are of signal importance in 
attempting to understand the dis/agreements framing the political in/dependence 
of Bermuda in 1995.  
 
  
CONCLUSION 
Both commissioned and official Government reports continue to highlight the 
continued inequalities of Bermuda. Although with a large black middle class, 
Bermuda remains a place where white Bermudians and residents still enjoy 
better jobs and higher rates of income; where significant steps are said to be 
needed to tackle institutional racism in Bermuda's business sector; and where 
the presence of Portuguese-Bermudians remain unacknowledged in official 
statistics differentiating between 'black', 'white' and 'other'. (endnote) At the same 
time Bermuda remains a colony where the interrogation of inequalities is deemed 
highly problematic and troublesome. In Bermuda, irrespective of major political 
reforms - the most recent and most dramatic one being the ending of three 
decades of UBP rule with the PLP General Election of 1998 - the vestiges of the 
'old colonial society' are very much alive. These explain the apparent ideological 
crisis which emerges when we begin to theorise the "public secret and very 
private obsession" (Lewis, op.cit: 325) of 'race' in the island and the 
entanglements of disavowal it resources. It is only by examining how such 
avoidance and marginalisation becomes politically encoded as a cultural practice 
and social dictate that we cease to be perplexed by a country like Bermuda that 
apparently advocates colonial independence and colonial dependency, 
simultaneously as if without contradiction. 
 
END NOTES 
1 Bermuda is located in the Atlantic Ocean, some distance away from the 
Caribbean islands. Although linked by similar colonial legacies, the overwhelming 
projection of Bermuda by Bermudians is that the Island is distinct and different, 
and only recently have efforts been made to forge definitive links with the 
Caribbean. T 
 
2 For background on Bermuda see Lefroy's Memorials of the Discovery and 
Early development of the Bermudas or Somers Island, 1515 - 1685 (London: 
Longman, 1877); Wesley Craven's An Introduction to Bermuda (Bermuda: 
Maritime Press, 1990); and Henry Wilkinson's Bermuda from Sail to Steam: The 
History of Island from 1784 - 1901, (London: Oxford Press, 1973). Books 
covering Bermudian slave society include Cyril Packwood's Chained on the 
Rock: Slavery in Bermuda (New York: Eliseo Torris, 1975); James Smith's 
Slavery in Bermuda (New York: Vantage Press, 1976). Also important is Kenneth 
Robinson's Heritage (London: Macmillan Press, 1985). 
 
3 For a discussion of Bermuda's political development see Frank Manning's 
Bermudian Politics in Transition (Bermuda: Island Press, 1978); Jeyaranan 
Wilson's 'Bermuda and the Future. The politics of Biracialism' (Round Table 
Debates, 1978); and Gordon Lewis' The Atlantic Perimeter. Bermuda and the 
Bahamas' in The Growth of the Modern West Indies, (London: MacGibbon and 
Kee), 1968.  
  
 
4  The Bermuda Woman Suffrage Society (BWSS) was founded by a small 
number of white women belonging to Bermuda's ruling class. For twenty-one 
years, the BWSS campaigned for the right of propertied women to vote. The 
suffragists' victory did not result in the greater participation of women in the 
political process, but it was central in the weakening of white minority rule. For an 
overview of the BWSS see Colin Benbow's Gladys Morrell and the Woman 
Suffrage Movement in Bermuda, (Bermuda: Writer's Machine, 1994) 
 
 5  The presence in the colony of people from the islands of the Azores and 
Madeira dates back to the late 1840s when indentured workers had been 
recruited to work as horticultural labourers. Despite objections that their presence 
would further curtail the economic opportunities of the working class and despite 
labour policies that effectively tied them to the horticultural industry, the numbers 
of Portuguese migrant workers grew. By 1939, they made up 8.3% of the total 
population. Although many still worked in horticulture, some had entered other 
occupations as land and shop owners, taxi drivers and hotel workers. 
(Richardson, 1948) Based on cultural difference (religion, language) and their 
continuing stigma of their initial recruitment, Portuguese- Bermudians continued 
to be socially and politically excluded. It was not until 1963 that the first 
Bermudian of Portuguese descent was elected to the House of Assembly. For 
information on Portuguese Bermudians see Patricia Mudd (1991). 
  
6 . Local writers Ira Philip (1987), Eva Hodgson 91988) Barbara Harris-Hunter 
(1993), and Walton Brown (1994) have written extensive on the transformations 
that occurred during this period. 
 
7 The government reports presented during the late 1970s include The Green 
Paper on Independence (1977) and The White Paper on Independence (1979) 
Also important is James Ahiakpor's, The Economic Consequences of Political 
Independence. The case of Bermuda, (Canada: The Fraser Institute Press). 
Information regarding the debates raging during this period was taken from the 
local papers, The Royal Gazette and the Bermuda Sun. 
 
8 The Bermuda House of Assembly Journals (Bermuda: Bermuda Archives, 
1959 - 1963), provide insight into the parliamentary debates and the opposition 
against the openly stated logic that underpinned the re-organising of Bermuda's 
electoral districts during this period. 
 
9 See Dorothy Newman, Bermuda's Stride toward the twenty-first century 
(Bermuda: Bermuda Government), 1994. 
 
 
  
 
